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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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GREECE-CYPRUS: Athens may appeal to major NATO powers following unproductive talks with Makarios



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CHILE: Signs of stronger line toward US.



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\*GREECE-CYPRUS: THE MEETING LAST WEEKEND BETWEEN CYPRIOT PRESIDENT MAKARIOS AND GREEK PRIME MINISTER PAPADOPOULOS DID NOT GO WELL, AND THE GREEKS MAY BE CONSIDERING AN APPEAL TO THE MAJOR WESTERN POWERS.

GREEK DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PALAMAS TOLD US AMBASSADOR TASCA THAT THE MAKARIOS VISIT LEFT UNSOLVED THE MANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS OVER AN APPROACH TO A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. WHEN MAKARIOS DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF TURKISH INTERVENTION ON CYPRUS, PAPADOPOULOS IS SAID TO HAVE WARNED THAT IF THE CYPRIOT PRESIDENT PROVOKED ANKARA, HE WOULD BE ON HIS OWN.

PALAMAS MAY BE PAINTING A GLOOMY PICTURE IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THE WESTERN POWERS TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN SEEKING A SETTLEMENT. PALAMAS INFORMED TASCA, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT MAKARIOS MAY ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE SOVIETS IN THE DISPUTE. THE GREEK DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO STATED THAT ATHENS INTENDS TO PREVENT ANY TURKISH INTERVENTION ON CYPRUS.

THE GREEKS APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM WHAT THEY BELIEVE IS A MEDIATING ROLE BETWEEN TURKEY AND CYPRUS. ATHENS PROBABLY IS CONVINCED THAT SUCH A ROLE COULD DAMAGE GREEK NATIONAL INTERESTS IN BOTH CYPRUS AND TURKEY. PALAMAS SAID HE WANTS TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL THANT, AS WELL AS US OFFICIALS, WHEN HE COMES TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION LATER THIS MONTH.

\* \* \* \*

The return early this week of retired Greek General Grivas to Cyprus will probably further unsettle the situation there. Grivas escaped surveillance in Athens and arrived clandestinely on the island. His presence on the island will greatly concern the Turkish Cypriots and alarm Ankara, which has long regarded Grivas as the primary proponent of the enosis movement.

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\*CHILE: PRESIDENT ALLENDE MAY NOW BE READY TO IMPLEMENT A STRONGER LINE IN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE US FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM A SUCCESSFUL TRIP TO ECUADOR, COLOMBIA, AND PERU.

THIS STANCE MAY EMERGE IN THE IMMINENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH US COPPER AND OTHER COMPANIES OVER NATIONALIZED PROPERTIES. IT COULD ALSO BE REFLECTED IN A DECISION THAT THE TIME IS PROPITIOUS TO ANNOUNCE A VISIT BY FIDEL CASTRO TO CHILE. THERE ARE ALREADY SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE GROWING ANTI-US FEELING WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT MAY BECOME CENTRAL TO ALLENDE'S POLICY. ALLENDE, FOR EXAMPLE, ADOPTED AN INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE AND BELLIGERENT ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US WHILE ON HIS TRIP.

IN CHILE, VICE PRESIDENT TOHA RAILED AGAINST US ECONOMIC POLICY THAT HE CHARGED WAS HINDERING CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT. FOLLOWING HIS RETURN ON 4 SEPTEMBER, ALLENDE BLAMED THE ECONOMIC DETERIORATION THAT HAD OCCURRED DURING HIS ABSENCE ON US ECONOMIC DOMINANCE. ANOTHER INDICATOR OF THIS NEW LINE IS THE FREQUENCY AND VICIOUSNESS OF ANTI-US ATTACKS BY NATIONAL TV COMMENTATORS AND IN PERIODICALS ESPECIALLY DURING THE PAST WEEK.

THE RECENT UPSURGE IN ANTI-US PROPAGANDA PROBABLY HAS BEEN GENERATED TO DIVERT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DISAPPOINTMENTS, AND UNPALATABLE ECONOMIC POLICIES THAT MAY BE ADOPTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ANY DRAMATIC ANTI-US ACTION IN COMING WEEKS MAY BE PORTRAYED AS REACTION TO RECENT CHANGES IN US ECONOMIC POLICY BUT WILL BE ENCOURAGED BY ALLENDE'S NEW-FOUND BELIEF IN HIS INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY.

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
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